ALGIERS: Ethiopia is hoping that talks with Egypt will ease a row over sharing the waters of the Nile, Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom said on Sunday during a trip to Algeria.
But Tedros did not rule out "international mediation" if the talks founder.
The dispute erupted after Ethiopia last month began diverting the Blue Nile River for the construction of its 6,000-megawatt Grand Renaissance Dam.
Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi has warned that "all options are open" because of concerns about the impact on downstream water levels.
"There is no reason that we cannot reach an agreement that benefits" all Nile countries, Tedros said at a joint news conference with Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci.
"Ethiopia is genuinely committed to solving any problem through dialogue and negotiations... we have to cooperate to share what nature has given us."
Tedros said he would travel soon to Cairo for further talks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr following a round of discussions earlier this month in Addis Ababa.
Some 86 percent of Nile water flowing to Egypt originates from the Blue Nile out of Ethiopia, and Cairo has said the construction of the dam is a security concern.
Ethiopia's parliament ratified a controversial treaty in early June ensuring its access to Nile water resources, replacing a colonial-era agreement that granted Egypt and Sudan the majority of water rights.
The new deal allows upstream countries to implement irrigation and hydropower projects without first seeking Egypt's approval.
Ethiopia says the $4.2-billion (3.2-billion-euro) dam is aimed at generating electricity for export to neighbouring countries, including Kenya and Djibouti.
It is set to become Africa's largest hydroelectric dam, with completion earmarked for 2017, and is being funded entirely from internal resources.
The Blue Nile joins the White Nile in the Sudanese capital Khartoum to form the Nile, which then flows through Egypt.
Read more: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Jun-30/222065-ethiopia-insists-on-talks-with-egypt-to-solve-nile-row.ashx#ixzz2XiOEIGaY
(The Daily Star :: Lebanon News :: http://www.dailystar.com.lb)
Sunday, June 30, 2013
Ethiopia: Growing Pains in Fertiliser Drive
Addis Fortune (Addis Ababa)
Even though farmers have reaped the benefits in earlier crop seasons by applying fertilisers, its current price and limited access to credit prohibit them from repeating the previous trend.Farmers are recommended to use one quintal of DAP and one quintal of Urea for a hectare of land in which the quantity varies based on the type of the soil.
Already in the midst of a long vacation, following the 10th grade national exam, Getachew Beyene, a 24-year-old farmer, was doing, on Tuesday, June 18, 2013, what he has been doing since the age of 10 – ploughing his Father’s farm.
Getachew is the youngest of 11 children in a sizable family. Beyene, his father, is a farmer in Zegula, one of the 25 kebeles in Dangla Wereda, 486Km North-West of Addis Abeba, in the Amhara Regional State.
A week ago, Getachew was ploughing the family’s 3.5ha of land, off the highway, a few kilometres on route to Bahir Dar from Dangla. The family predominantly harvests teff, sorghum and corn, each producing no less than 10 quintals a year.
Getachew is the last of Beyene’s children still living with his family. He, too, may be gone come September, if he scores sufficiently well in the national exam. On Tuesday, he was doing the farm work assisted by a hired hand, who is paid 50 Br a day.
His departure, though, will not come before he has made sure that all the farm land has been ploughed and sowed on.
Last week, was far too early to start sowing and using the big booster fertiliser – a component agricultural extension workers across the country are pushing farmers to use, in order to increase the nation’s productivity.
Poor growth in agricultural productivity was a source of disappointment among leaders of the ruling EPRDF party, during their March congress, in Bahir Dar, Amhara’s capital, 88Km north of where Getachew lives. The 6.95pc growth achieved in 2011/12 was only half the amount the government had planned for. This has led to political pressure on extension workers to push farmers to employ harvest increasing methods.
The use of fertilisers and selected seeds are two of the methods used regularly by farmers across the country. Yet to be distributed, the Zegula Kebele Farmers Cooperative has 2,500ql of fertiliser, manufactured in Saudi Arabia by Ma’aden Phosphate Company, and supplied to Ethiopia by Ameropa AG, from its warehouse. The amount is lower, by 500ql, than last year’s, because there was excess from the previous year’s supply, but the warehouse keepers believe that the zone’s Agriculture Bureau has supplied them with enough product, in time for the farming season. They have also received seed for maize, which is priced at 197 Br for 14Kg.
The Cooperative, to which the Beyene family belongs, has 2,500 members. Its warehouse is located approximately one kilometre from the family farm. The family may buy five quintals of fertiliser for the current season, out of the total of 977,000 availed to farmers, nationally.
In another part of the country, a farmer – who enjoyed a bigger harvest last year, using fertiliser – is prepping his farm for yet another round of use. Kassa Mamo, a father of six, lives in Adulala Hate Haroreti kebele, in Eastern Oromia. He attributes his 40ql harvest to applying fertiliser on his two-hectare farm. This farming season he intends to lease two more hectares from the neighbourhood.
When the local development agent appeared at his door to advise on the use of fertilisers, Kassa readily indicated that he was acquiring four quintals each of DAP and Urea, although he would later rethink the quantity.
The planning process of fertiliser import begins with an assessment of demand, for the next agricultural year, at a local level. The wereda Agricultural Bureau collects data on expected local fertiliser demand, which is provided by agricultural extension workers, working at the kebele level.
The current season has come with a little surprise for Kassa; last year he said he bought DAP for 1,440 Br a quintal and Urea for 1,100 Br (the Union gives slightly higher prices for both: 1,457 Br and 1,175 Br, respectively). He is now concerned that he will have to pay 64 Br and 113 Br more, for DAP and Urea, respectively (using the Union’s figures, he will actually be paying 47 Br more for DAP and 38 Br more for Urea). He said this difference is too much for him, despite his increased production last year because of the fertiliser. Having failed to get a loan from his neighbours, he says, he has decided to reduce his fertiliser order by half.
“Sadly, I have decided to sow other kinds of crops that do not need fertilisers on two hectares, where I was prepared to sow teff,” he told Fortune.
The Erer Farmers’ Cooperative Union, from which Kassa’s fertiliser demand will be served, has four member cooperatives: Ade’a, Liben, Ginbichu and Akaki. The farmers’ cooperatives in these weredas get their agricultural inputs from the Union.
Based on the demand assessment collected by the wereda’s Agriculture Bureau, the Federal Agricultural Inputs Supply Enterprise (AISE) has availed 8,1569ql of DAP and 4,6635ql of Urea, for the 2013/14 season in addition to the last year’s leftover, across the four cooperatives, according to Mekonen Haile, manager of the Union.
In another part of the country, a farmer – who enjoyed a bigger harvest last year, using fertiliser – is prepping his farm for yet another round of use. Kassa Mamo, a father of six, lives in Adulala Hate Haroreti kebele, in Eastern Oromia. He attributes his 40ql harvest to applying fertiliser on his two-hectare farm. This farming season he intends to lease two more hectares from the neighbourhood.
When the local development agent appeared at his door to advise on the use of fertilisers, Kassa readily indicated that he was acquiring four quintals each of DAP and Urea, although he would later rethink the quantity.
The planning process of fertiliser import begins with an assessment of demand, for the next agricultural year, at a local level. The wereda Agricultural Bureau collects data on expected local fertiliser demand, which is provided by agricultural extension workers, working at the kebele level.
The current season has come with a little surprise for Kassa; last year he said he bought DAP for 1,440 Br a quintal and Urea for 1,100 Br (the Union gives slightly higher prices for both: 1,457 Br and 1,175 Br, respectively). He is now concerned that he will have to pay 64 Br and 113 Br more, for DAP and Urea, respectively (using the Union’s figures, he will actually be paying 47 Br more for DAP and 38 Br more for Urea). He said this difference is too much for him, despite his increased production last year because of the fertiliser. Having failed to get a loan from his neighbours, he says, he has decided to reduce his fertiliser order by half.
“Sadly, I have decided to sow other kinds of crops that do not need fertilisers on two hectares, where I was prepared to sow teff,” he told Fortune.
The Erer Farmers’ Cooperative Union, from which Kassa’s fertiliser demand will be served, has four member cooperatives: Ade’a, Liben, Ginbichu and Akaki. The farmers’ cooperatives in these weredas get their agricultural inputs from the Union.
Based on the demand assessment collected by the wereda’s Agriculture Bureau, the Federal Agricultural Inputs Supply Enterprise (AISE) has availed 8,1569ql of DAP and 4,6635ql of Urea, for the 2013/14 season in addition to the last year’s leftover, across the four cooperatives, according to Mekonen Haile, manager of the Union.
The Union’s store at Adama is currently selling a quintal of DAP for 1,504 Br and a quintal of Urea for 1,213 Br, although the price goes up when the distance increases, according to Mekonnen.
The price escalation is attributed to the fertiliser that was transferred from the previous year’s stock by the Union. The Union has 29,204ql of DAP and 12,617ql of Urea in the store, transferred from the previous year.
“We are paying the bank 11.4 Br a month in credit interest, as well as one Birr warehouse fees, a month for each quintal. That leads us to have to recalculate our expenses on the current price of the fertiliser,” Mekonen said.
In addition to the 477,000tns of fertiliser imported this year, the Federal Agricultural Inputs Supply Enterprise has 500,000tns in store from last year. However, the Ade’a Union managed to deliver only 55pc of the supply, as of Monday, June 17, 2013.
“When the farmers notice that there will be a change in the weather condition, they alter the type of seed they sow and reduce the amount of fertiliser they have requested”, says Kebede Tulu, production capacity building team leader at Ade’a Wereda Agricultural Bureau, in explaining the problem.
A study, conducted in 2012, by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) on the supply and distribution of fertiliser in Ethiopia, indicates that regional holding companies, such as – Ambassel, Guna, Wondo, and Dinsho; Cooperative Unions and private companies were involved, alongside the AISE, in the import and distribution of fertiliser, following market liberalisation in Ethiopia. However, following the changes in 2008, when the AISE became the sole importer, the role of the Unions is now limited to distribution, from central warehouses to primary cooperatives.
The study found mixed views about giving the monopoly of power to the AISE. While the centralised procurement system has proved useful, with respect to ensuring the allocation of foreign exchange and timely fertiliser procurement, many cooperative leaders thought that centralised importing through the AISE had increased fertiliser costs.
The AISE supplies the fertilisers it has imported to Unions in the country, based on their demands.
“However, regions have their own strategies to sell the fertiliser,” Sayfu Aseffa, agricultural inputs loan senior expert at the Enterprise, says. “Except Oromia Region, which decided not to sell on credit, two years ago, the Southern Region requires 25pc to 50pc down payment. Amhara Region makes credit sales only for dry areas and Tigray Region gives credit for those who cannot afford to buy.”
“We are paying the bank 11.4 Br a month in credit interest, as well as one Birr warehouse fees, a month for each quintal. That leads us to have to recalculate our expenses on the current price of the fertiliser,” Mekonen said.
In addition to the 477,000tns of fertiliser imported this year, the Federal Agricultural Inputs Supply Enterprise has 500,000tns in store from last year. However, the Ade’a Union managed to deliver only 55pc of the supply, as of Monday, June 17, 2013.
“When the farmers notice that there will be a change in the weather condition, they alter the type of seed they sow and reduce the amount of fertiliser they have requested”, says Kebede Tulu, production capacity building team leader at Ade’a Wereda Agricultural Bureau, in explaining the problem.
A study, conducted in 2012, by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) on the supply and distribution of fertiliser in Ethiopia, indicates that regional holding companies, such as – Ambassel, Guna, Wondo, and Dinsho; Cooperative Unions and private companies were involved, alongside the AISE, in the import and distribution of fertiliser, following market liberalisation in Ethiopia. However, following the changes in 2008, when the AISE became the sole importer, the role of the Unions is now limited to distribution, from central warehouses to primary cooperatives.
The study found mixed views about giving the monopoly of power to the AISE. While the centralised procurement system has proved useful, with respect to ensuring the allocation of foreign exchange and timely fertiliser procurement, many cooperative leaders thought that centralised importing through the AISE had increased fertiliser costs.
The AISE supplies the fertilisers it has imported to Unions in the country, based on their demands.
“However, regions have their own strategies to sell the fertiliser,” Sayfu Aseffa, agricultural inputs loan senior expert at the Enterprise, says. “Except Oromia Region, which decided not to sell on credit, two years ago, the Southern Region requires 25pc to 50pc down payment. Amhara Region makes credit sales only for dry areas and Tigray Region gives credit for those who cannot afford to buy.”
Getachew, in Amhara, finds himself in the region where full payment is required.
“They could have at least offered us half the amount on credit,” Getachew told Fortune, as he unyoked Boren and Jember, the names by which the pair of farm oxen go in his family.
According to Seyfu, it has been very challenging for the government to collect the credit given to the farmers, with a lot of money yet to be collected in many regions.
In 2011/12, the AISE imported 560,000tns of DAP and 328tns of Urea, for a total of 8.4 billion Br; this year it reduced its imports significantly, to 350,000tns of DAP and 127,000tns of Urea, for a total of 2.6 billion Br, because of product left over from the previous year.
The price at the central store in Addis Abeba is 1252 Br, for DAP, and 980 Br for Urea fertiliser, a quintal.
According to the IFPRI’s study, farmers have claimed that they could not afford fertiliser at current prices. They said that fertiliser prices have been increasing since 2009, with credit being extremely limited and cash sales openly promoted by cooperatives and agriculture officials.
“Does the farmer have enough money to buy all the fertiliser he needs?” asks an expert at the Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA), adding that a survey by the Agency had indicated that there was a decline in fertiliser consumption in Oromia and the Southern regions, following the strict cash sale.
The Agency and the Ministry of Agriculture are currently working on reintroducing fertiliser credit sales using microfinance institutions.
Until then, farmers, such as Getachew and Kassa will either have to come up with the cash or abstain from using fertiliser, even though they have apparently already reaped the benefits in earlier crop seasons.
“They could have at least offered us half the amount on credit,” Getachew told Fortune, as he unyoked Boren and Jember, the names by which the pair of farm oxen go in his family.
According to Seyfu, it has been very challenging for the government to collect the credit given to the farmers, with a lot of money yet to be collected in many regions.
In 2011/12, the AISE imported 560,000tns of DAP and 328tns of Urea, for a total of 8.4 billion Br; this year it reduced its imports significantly, to 350,000tns of DAP and 127,000tns of Urea, for a total of 2.6 billion Br, because of product left over from the previous year.
The price at the central store in Addis Abeba is 1252 Br, for DAP, and 980 Br for Urea fertiliser, a quintal.
According to the IFPRI’s study, farmers have claimed that they could not afford fertiliser at current prices. They said that fertiliser prices have been increasing since 2009, with credit being extremely limited and cash sales openly promoted by cooperatives and agriculture officials.
“Does the farmer have enough money to buy all the fertiliser he needs?” asks an expert at the Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA), adding that a survey by the Agency had indicated that there was a decline in fertiliser consumption in Oromia and the Southern regions, following the strict cash sale.
The Agency and the Ministry of Agriculture are currently working on reintroducing fertiliser credit sales using microfinance institutions.
Until then, farmers, such as Getachew and Kassa will either have to come up with the cash or abstain from using fertiliser, even though they have apparently already reaped the benefits in earlier crop seasons.
Ethiopia’s tech hopefuls
By Jonathan Kalan, BBC
When it comes to technology and innovation, Ethiopia appears a long way away from the rest of Africa's rising "silicon savannahs."
The most advanced form of banking in Africa's second most populous country is an ATM - there are no credit cards and no international banking systems.This makes app stores like Google Play and Apple's Appstore inaccessible.
Mobile money, which has taken off places like Kenya, has only just arrived, but with significant limitations. Skype and other VoIP (voice over internet protocol) services are banned for business purposes. With a lumbering government-owned telecoms monopoly, staggeringly low internet penetration (less than 1% of Ethiopia's 85m citizens are connected), just 17% mobile penetration, and a very "security conscious" government approach to new technology and services, it's not the most encouraging environment for small technology start-ups to grow. But that doesn't mean some aren't trying. "There are a lot of opportunities for techies in Ethiopia," claims Markos Lemma, co-founder of iceaddis, Ethiopia's leading technology hub, accelerator and co-working space. "The middle class is increasing, the market is growing," he says. In recent years Ethiopia has become a model of rising Africa. From a poster child for poverty and famine in the 1980s to an economy seeing an average 10% growth since 2004, the country is witnessing a remarkable turnaround. Addis Ababa, the capital, is attracting investment and talent from around the world, and cranes and construction projects are now a hallmark of the city. Yet much of this growth is from sweeping policy changes, government infrastructure projects, and big donor-driven or private investment programmes. Iceaddis, which opened its doors in May 2011, is trying to change this. It has become a home for start-ups, promoting local technology and focusing on young Ethiopian entrepreneurs and individuals interested in ICT, green technology, and the creative industries. Originally designed as an art gallery by a Swiss architect, it is a striking mash-up of six interlocked shipping containers, located on the Ethiopian Institute of Architecture, Building, Construction and City Development (EiABC) campus, in the heart of the capital. "In the beginning, we didn't know what exactly what we were working on," admits Mr Lemma, one of the four co-founders. "We were just bringing the community together to interact." Similar to other tech hubs in the region, like Nairobi's iHub, or Uganda's Hive Colab, iceaddis grew organically, starting with small events, workshops, and barcamps (tech-related developer meet-ups). The goal was to connect bloggers and developers, bringing a hidden tech community together for the first time. Eventually, the community grew; iceaddis secured more funding, moved into its own space, and developed a tiered membership. They now have over 1,000 'white' members, people who may not use the space everyday, but are part of the network. Several times a year, iceaddis selects a few dozen start-ups and puts them through 12 weeks of business plan training. At the end of the programme, several are selected to receive "incubation" at the space, and given resources to grow their ideas. Unlike many other tech hubs in Africa, iceaddis isn't just about apps. Plugging in to the surrounding architecture school, the community also highlights innovation in design, construction, and products. During one week in March, students were learning how to design and build DIY skateboard ramps. A few weeks later, they were hacking android apps. Yet the barriers to innovation for young Ethiopian entrepreneurs, regardless of industry, remain high. "There is much willingness and interest from the government for entrepreneurship," says Mr Lemma. "But there is still so much regulation and permits." Growing pains Feleg Tsegaye is an American-born Ethiopian who previously worked in IT at the US Federal Reserve. He recently moved to Addis to found ArifMobile, a phone and sim card rental service for tourists, and knows these challenges well. "People aren't always sure of the laws. They seem fluid and changing depending on who you talk to," he says of Ethiopia's regulatory environment. For example, only after multiple trips to the Ministry of Business to register his company did he discover business names cannot be adjectives. Then, it took months to get an internet connection in his office thanks to notoriously slow state-owned Ethio Telecom. In the World Economic Form's Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013, Ethiopia ranks almost dead last. Of 144 countries, it's ranked below 130 in technological readiness, competitiveness, and access to financial services and loans. Perhaps one of the reasons for such a dismal competitive environment is when it comes to technology, the government is often both the biggest competitor and biggest client. Most large companies are either state-owned, or partially state-owned, and there is a certain degree of distrust between private and public sectors resulting in the government taking a very security-conscious approach, according to Mr Tsegaye. "Government is the prime consumer for services in IT, but they are frustrated, in part because their policies are inhibiting private sector growth," he says. Adam Abate, founder of Apposit, an information technology services company based in Addis Ababa, says that the government is by far his biggest client. "We looked at private sector for a while and realised it's not worth it," he says. "Collecting, digitising, and maintaining information for consumers at scale is not easy." The most obvious opportunity in Ethiopia is that there's still very little here” Adam Abate Apposit Mr Abate also notes the difficulties posed by the telecoms monopoly. "It's good for investing in infrastructure and for the future, but from an individual or business point of view, trying to get services out of them is a nightmare." All told, Ethiopia has a weak ecosystem for start-ups, says Mr Abate, making it difficult for young, inexperienced entrepreneurs with little capital. The odds are stacked against them. Yet, he says, for those who manage, there is enormous opportunity. "Infrastructure is … expanding at a rapid rate, and the most obvious opportunity in Ethiopia is that there's still very little here," he explains. "Any business you can think of, you can start." Start at the beginning One as yet unnamed startup is trying to develop an appstore specifically for Ethiopia that will charge users via premium SMS services, which will hopefully open up a space for local app developers. Another company, Utopia, is developing an Android app for tourists that can be used offline. Mekina, one of iceaddis' most successful startups, has built an online marketplace for Ethiopians to buy, sell, and rent cars locally, a big coup given the government levies five different taxes for importing vehicles. Still, like the current market itself, these efforts are small. "People just aren't consuming things online. They aren't connected, and those who are, are just using Facebook," says iceaddis's Markos Lemma. Yet entrepreneurs remain hopeful things will change. The government is planning to build a $250 million technology park, Ethio ICT, although critics worry it's another of Africa's pipe-dream tech cities. "There is high potential for techies to develop applications and technical solutions," says Mr Lemma. "But we need more support, resources, knowledge." A tech park probably won't offer that. With 85 million Ethiopians slowly becoming connected, if the government loosens its grip and becomes serious about supporting entrepreneurship, an Ethiopian tech boom may be on the horizon. Even if internet penetration increases to cover even just 2-3% of the population, Mr Lemma says, "opportunities to improve business will improve greatly."
When it comes to technology and innovation, Ethiopia appears a long way away from the rest of Africa's rising "silicon savannahs."
The most advanced form of banking in Africa's second most populous country is an ATM - there are no credit cards and no international banking systems.This makes app stores like Google Play and Apple's Appstore inaccessible.
Mobile money, which has taken off places like Kenya, has only just arrived, but with significant limitations. Skype and other VoIP (voice over internet protocol) services are banned for business purposes. With a lumbering government-owned telecoms monopoly, staggeringly low internet penetration (less than 1% of Ethiopia's 85m citizens are connected), just 17% mobile penetration, and a very "security conscious" government approach to new technology and services, it's not the most encouraging environment for small technology start-ups to grow. But that doesn't mean some aren't trying. "There are a lot of opportunities for techies in Ethiopia," claims Markos Lemma, co-founder of iceaddis, Ethiopia's leading technology hub, accelerator and co-working space. "The middle class is increasing, the market is growing," he says. In recent years Ethiopia has become a model of rising Africa. From a poster child for poverty and famine in the 1980s to an economy seeing an average 10% growth since 2004, the country is witnessing a remarkable turnaround. Addis Ababa, the capital, is attracting investment and talent from around the world, and cranes and construction projects are now a hallmark of the city. Yet much of this growth is from sweeping policy changes, government infrastructure projects, and big donor-driven or private investment programmes. Iceaddis, which opened its doors in May 2011, is trying to change this. It has become a home for start-ups, promoting local technology and focusing on young Ethiopian entrepreneurs and individuals interested in ICT, green technology, and the creative industries. Originally designed as an art gallery by a Swiss architect, it is a striking mash-up of six interlocked shipping containers, located on the Ethiopian Institute of Architecture, Building, Construction and City Development (EiABC) campus, in the heart of the capital. "In the beginning, we didn't know what exactly what we were working on," admits Mr Lemma, one of the four co-founders. "We were just bringing the community together to interact." Similar to other tech hubs in the region, like Nairobi's iHub, or Uganda's Hive Colab, iceaddis grew organically, starting with small events, workshops, and barcamps (tech-related developer meet-ups). The goal was to connect bloggers and developers, bringing a hidden tech community together for the first time. Eventually, the community grew; iceaddis secured more funding, moved into its own space, and developed a tiered membership. They now have over 1,000 'white' members, people who may not use the space everyday, but are part of the network. Several times a year, iceaddis selects a few dozen start-ups and puts them through 12 weeks of business plan training. At the end of the programme, several are selected to receive "incubation" at the space, and given resources to grow their ideas. Unlike many other tech hubs in Africa, iceaddis isn't just about apps. Plugging in to the surrounding architecture school, the community also highlights innovation in design, construction, and products. During one week in March, students were learning how to design and build DIY skateboard ramps. A few weeks later, they were hacking android apps. Yet the barriers to innovation for young Ethiopian entrepreneurs, regardless of industry, remain high. "There is much willingness and interest from the government for entrepreneurship," says Mr Lemma. "But there is still so much regulation and permits." Growing pains Feleg Tsegaye is an American-born Ethiopian who previously worked in IT at the US Federal Reserve. He recently moved to Addis to found ArifMobile, a phone and sim card rental service for tourists, and knows these challenges well. "People aren't always sure of the laws. They seem fluid and changing depending on who you talk to," he says of Ethiopia's regulatory environment. For example, only after multiple trips to the Ministry of Business to register his company did he discover business names cannot be adjectives. Then, it took months to get an internet connection in his office thanks to notoriously slow state-owned Ethio Telecom. In the World Economic Form's Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013, Ethiopia ranks almost dead last. Of 144 countries, it's ranked below 130 in technological readiness, competitiveness, and access to financial services and loans. Perhaps one of the reasons for such a dismal competitive environment is when it comes to technology, the government is often both the biggest competitor and biggest client. Most large companies are either state-owned, or partially state-owned, and there is a certain degree of distrust between private and public sectors resulting in the government taking a very security-conscious approach, according to Mr Tsegaye. "Government is the prime consumer for services in IT, but they are frustrated, in part because their policies are inhibiting private sector growth," he says. Adam Abate, founder of Apposit, an information technology services company based in Addis Ababa, says that the government is by far his biggest client. "We looked at private sector for a while and realised it's not worth it," he says. "Collecting, digitising, and maintaining information for consumers at scale is not easy." The most obvious opportunity in Ethiopia is that there's still very little here” Adam Abate Apposit Mr Abate also notes the difficulties posed by the telecoms monopoly. "It's good for investing in infrastructure and for the future, but from an individual or business point of view, trying to get services out of them is a nightmare." All told, Ethiopia has a weak ecosystem for start-ups, says Mr Abate, making it difficult for young, inexperienced entrepreneurs with little capital. The odds are stacked against them. Yet, he says, for those who manage, there is enormous opportunity. "Infrastructure is … expanding at a rapid rate, and the most obvious opportunity in Ethiopia is that there's still very little here," he explains. "Any business you can think of, you can start." Start at the beginning One as yet unnamed startup is trying to develop an appstore specifically for Ethiopia that will charge users via premium SMS services, which will hopefully open up a space for local app developers. Another company, Utopia, is developing an Android app for tourists that can be used offline. Mekina, one of iceaddis' most successful startups, has built an online marketplace for Ethiopians to buy, sell, and rent cars locally, a big coup given the government levies five different taxes for importing vehicles. Still, like the current market itself, these efforts are small. "People just aren't consuming things online. They aren't connected, and those who are, are just using Facebook," says iceaddis's Markos Lemma. Yet entrepreneurs remain hopeful things will change. The government is planning to build a $250 million technology park, Ethio ICT, although critics worry it's another of Africa's pipe-dream tech cities. "There is high potential for techies to develop applications and technical solutions," says Mr Lemma. "But we need more support, resources, knowledge." A tech park probably won't offer that. With 85 million Ethiopians slowly becoming connected, if the government loosens its grip and becomes serious about supporting entrepreneurship, an Ethiopian tech boom may be on the horizon. Even if internet penetration increases to cover even just 2-3% of the population, Mr Lemma says, "opportunities to improve business will improve greatly."
Ethiopia among countries to receive President Obama's $7 billion electrical power initiative
JOHANNESBURG, June 30 (Reuters) - Pointing to Africa's crippling lack of electrical power, President Barack Obama is due to announce on Sunday a $7 billion initiative over five years to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa.
"We see this as the next phase in our development strategy and a real focal point in the president's agenda going forward," deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes told reporters traveling with the president.
Obama is midway through a three-country tour of Africa and is due to give what aides bill as his fullest description of his vision for the U.S. relationship with the continent on Sunday.
The president has chosen historically resonant locations for the address, and is due to speak at the University of Cape Town after touring the prison on Robben Island. Robert F. Kennedy's 1966 speech at the university linked the struggles against apartheid and the U.S. civil rights movement and was seen as giving encouragement to the movement, while Robben Island is where anti-apartheid icon Nelson Mandela was imprisoned for 18 of his 27 years in jail.
The president will cite South Africa's long struggle to defeat apartheid and the U.S. civil rights movement's success in overcoming racial inequality as models of movements that brought about change in the face of daunting obstacles, aides said. He will call on young Africans to summon similar energy to complete the work of those movements and to firmly establish economic growth, democratic government, and stable societies across the continent.
SIGNATURE PROGRAM
Obama has been faulted for lacking a grand program to benefit Africa like the HIV/AIDS initiative launched by President George W. Bush or the broad reductions of trade barriers achieved by President Bill Clinton.
Many Africans have been disappointed at what they see as Obama's hands-off approach to the continent, noting that his first extended trip the continent has not come until his second term in office despite his African ancestry. Obama's father was a native of Kenya.
The president's aides say he has been held back by the need to wind down two wars and to right the U.S. economy after the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression.
Despite severe U.S. budget constraints, the power initiative could provide Obama with just such a signature program.
DARKNESS BY NIGHT
Experts agree that the lack of electricity is a tremendous hindrance to Africa's advancement.
"Africa is largely a continent of darkness by night," said an official at a multilateral agency who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Every which way you look at this, Africa is behind the curve and pays more."
Roughly two-thirds of sub-Saharan Africa lacks power, a level that rises as high as 85 percent in rural areas, White House aide Gayle Smith said.
Lack of power inhibits business investment, prevents children from studying after dark, and makes it harder to keep vaccines from spoiling in rural areas, she said.
The United States will initially work with Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Tanzania to develop electric power generation, officials said. It will also cooperate with Uganda and Mozambique on oil and gas management.
The program will draw on a range of U.S. government agencies to achieve its goals. For example, the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corp will commit as much as $1.5 billion in finance and insurance to help U.S. companies manage the risks associated with the projects.
Similarly, the U.S. Export-Import Bank will make up to $5 billion available to support U.S. exports to develop power projects, the officials said.
The private sector will also be involved. Officials said General Electric Co has committed to power generation projects in Tanzania and Ghana, officials added.
The president's trip has taken him to Senegal and South Africa and will wind up in Tanzania on Monday and Tuesday. Although concerns over the ailing health of anti-apartheid hero Mandela have overshadowed much of the trip, the president has sounded the theme of Africa's economic potential at every stop.
In keeping with that emphasis, Obama will also announce that he plans to hold a summit of sub-Saharan African leaders in Washington next year.
"It's something other countries have done," Rhodes said. "What we want to do is continue the kind of high-level engagement we've had on this trip."
"We see this as the next phase in our development strategy and a real focal point in the president's agenda going forward," deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes told reporters traveling with the president.
Obama is midway through a three-country tour of Africa and is due to give what aides bill as his fullest description of his vision for the U.S. relationship with the continent on Sunday.
The president has chosen historically resonant locations for the address, and is due to speak at the University of Cape Town after touring the prison on Robben Island. Robert F. Kennedy's 1966 speech at the university linked the struggles against apartheid and the U.S. civil rights movement and was seen as giving encouragement to the movement, while Robben Island is where anti-apartheid icon Nelson Mandela was imprisoned for 18 of his 27 years in jail.
The president will cite South Africa's long struggle to defeat apartheid and the U.S. civil rights movement's success in overcoming racial inequality as models of movements that brought about change in the face of daunting obstacles, aides said. He will call on young Africans to summon similar energy to complete the work of those movements and to firmly establish economic growth, democratic government, and stable societies across the continent.
SIGNATURE PROGRAM
Obama has been faulted for lacking a grand program to benefit Africa like the HIV/AIDS initiative launched by President George W. Bush or the broad reductions of trade barriers achieved by President Bill Clinton.
Many Africans have been disappointed at what they see as Obama's hands-off approach to the continent, noting that his first extended trip the continent has not come until his second term in office despite his African ancestry. Obama's father was a native of Kenya.
The president's aides say he has been held back by the need to wind down two wars and to right the U.S. economy after the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression.
Despite severe U.S. budget constraints, the power initiative could provide Obama with just such a signature program.
DARKNESS BY NIGHT
Experts agree that the lack of electricity is a tremendous hindrance to Africa's advancement.
"Africa is largely a continent of darkness by night," said an official at a multilateral agency who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Every which way you look at this, Africa is behind the curve and pays more."
Roughly two-thirds of sub-Saharan Africa lacks power, a level that rises as high as 85 percent in rural areas, White House aide Gayle Smith said.
Lack of power inhibits business investment, prevents children from studying after dark, and makes it harder to keep vaccines from spoiling in rural areas, she said.
The United States will initially work with Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Tanzania to develop electric power generation, officials said. It will also cooperate with Uganda and Mozambique on oil and gas management.
The program will draw on a range of U.S. government agencies to achieve its goals. For example, the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corp will commit as much as $1.5 billion in finance and insurance to help U.S. companies manage the risks associated with the projects.
Similarly, the U.S. Export-Import Bank will make up to $5 billion available to support U.S. exports to develop power projects, the officials said.
The private sector will also be involved. Officials said General Electric Co has committed to power generation projects in Tanzania and Ghana, officials added.
The president's trip has taken him to Senegal and South Africa and will wind up in Tanzania on Monday and Tuesday. Although concerns over the ailing health of anti-apartheid hero Mandela have overshadowed much of the trip, the president has sounded the theme of Africa's economic potential at every stop.
In keeping with that emphasis, Obama will also announce that he plans to hold a summit of sub-Saharan African leaders in Washington next year.
"It's something other countries have done," Rhodes said. "What we want to do is continue the kind of high-level engagement we've had on this trip."
Possibilities of a new Ethiopian consensus
By Tesfaye Demmellash (Ph.D.)
The founding principles and aims of progressive politics in Ethiopia may not be entirely in doubt today, but its operative ideas and practices have long been open to question and critique. This is true, though Ethiopian literati have generally not shown interest in subjecting our vexing legacy of progressivism to retrospective scrutiny and in assessing its current status and function.
The founding principles and aims of progressive politics in Ethiopia may not be entirely in doubt today, but its operative ideas and practices have long been open to question and critique. This is true, though Ethiopian literati have generally not shown interest in subjecting our vexing legacy of progressivism to retrospective scrutiny and in assessing its current status and function.
No longer persuasive intellectually, morally, and politically, particularly to Ethiopia’s younger generation, the staying power of the old progressivism within the Woyane regime and in some oppositions circles lies in the inertia of established, residual conventions and habits of Marxist-Leninist thought. Its “radical” attitudes, ideology, and practice have consistently produced tyrannical leaders and repressive regimes (those of the Derg, the TPLF and, in Eritrea, the EPLF). It has everywhere turned the promise of national revolution into an exclusive partisan performance and the democratic aspirations of the people into the dictatorial agenda of narrow, insular elites.
So we know that, far from offering simple and ready solutions to our national problems, the existing tradition of forward-looking politics is deeply problematic. In fact, it constitutes a major source of Ethiopia’s present national crisis. If it is to help bring about the nation’s democratic renewal, our troubled progressive inheritance has to undergo major conceptual and practical renovation itself. It has to be thought anew – from the ground up.
This is a necessary first step toward a new progressive national agreement in Ethiopia. Patterns of dogmatic thought, forms and mechanisms of partisan dictatorship and styles of anti-Ethiopian rhetoric and polemic associated with the old tradition of “radical” politics are today integral parts of oppositional as well as ruling ethnonationalist orthodoxy. How could contemporary Ethiopian patriots strike a grand progressive bargain with champions of this orthodoxy whose resentment of Ethiopia borders on a reverse chauvinism that devalues and negates our common national culture?
So opening up the old tradition of progressivism in Ethiopia – in all its partisan and tribal forms – to critical, forward-looking reconstruction is essential to the building of a new, more democratic general agreement among the nation’s diverse political, ethnic, and cultural communities. The dismantling of the present, moribund system should create intellectual and political space for thinking up alternative ideas of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, federalism, and local self-government in Ethiopia. It should allow new ideas to be more freely articulated, debated, discussed, and agreed upon by the widest possible Ethiopian public. In short, the dismantling of the old paradigm of revolutionary thought and action can be expected to facilitate the elimination, finally, of dictatorially imposed rule in Ethiopia and allow for a lasting consensually achieved democratic national and political order in the country.
Though possible and desirable, the building of a new Ethiopian progressive consensus today is, however, a great challenge. The collective effort has to resolve not only the differences and antagonisms of particular parties, groups, coalitions, and movements, but also the conflicts of distinct modes of national concern: ethnic nationalism, modern Ethiopian national consciousness that transcends ethnicity, and traditional patriotism that stresses Ethiopian historical roots and identity. In some of their extreme variants, these forms of national concern may be repellent to one another, but they are not entirely self-contained and mutually exclusive. Still, they remain recognizable species of nationalism to be reckoned with by consensus builders. Separately, none of them adequately represents the breadth and depth of Ethiopianness today. Indeed, both governing and oppositional forms of ethnonationalism militate against the Ethiopian experience, a matter of great concern and urgency for patriotic forces.
Traditional patriots who accentuate Ethiopian historical sources and identity are not necessarily averse to modern ideas, like democracy and federalism, but such ideas may not be the major driving force of their national concern. Sensing, correctly, the existential threat Ethiopia faces under the divisive tyranny of the Woyanes and the wholesale tribalization of her national interests and affairs, some may be in no mood currently to quibble about ideas. Perhaps disenchanted with the global values of progressivism some Ethiopian patriots may be turning inward in resistance, pushed by prevailing conditions in the country to a protective affirmation of tradition and identity.
Reclaiming and defending the national base is essential, but we can’t go back to our roots simply and straightaway, in abstraction from present progressive concerns. There is a danger here of patriotic groups inflicting political marginalization on themselves in their disinclination to address major issues confronting the country today. The biggest challenge we face is reconciling the claims of national tradition and integrity with those of contemporary pluralism and diversity through a new Ethiopian national-democratic consensus and solidarity.
The initial task of developing a general forward-looking agreement among various groups and forces in the resistance against TPLF dictatorship, with a keen eye toward post-Woyane Ethiopian political order, is one of establishing a broadly inclusive yet definite framework of ideas, principles, and practices. We need a widely shared set of terms, concepts, and perspectives through which Ethiopian national and political issues may be commonly as well as distinctively defined, grasped, and approached. The framework of thought and discourse should be capable of integrally handling pluralism, difference, and dissent in our common national life.
Departing from this basic understanding, I offer the following theses on progressive change in Ethiopia. The theses are summary notes intended for discussion and further analysis among concerned Ethiopian intellectuals, activists, journalists, opposition entities, civil society groups, and other stake-holders. They are organized around three major overlapping spheres which I consider to be crucial battlegrounds where Ethiopian progressive consensus has to be fought for and won, where we leave the old progressivism behind and embrace the new. These battlegrounds are politics, ideas, and identity.
Theses on Progressive Change in Ethiopia
Politics
1. The underlying defect of the old and still operative paradigm of progressivism in Ethiopia (and Eritrea) is its aggressive, expansionist take-over and domination of the relatively autonomous spheres of ideas, culture, religion, nationality, economy, polity and civil society, more or less incorporating all these domains in calculations and strategies of imperious partisan power. Operating solely or primarily on the basis of priorities and agenda set unilaterally by a narrow political elite with unlimited appetite for power, the paradigm reduces all of these spheres of social and national life to objects and extensions of dictatorial rule.
This is a systemic flaw characteristic of an entire tradition of revolutionary thought and practice, not merely that of particular parties and fronts. The claim here is that the paradigm itself – rather than its “failure” or distortion – led not only to the tyrannical regimes of the Derg and the TPLF but, more broadly, to the self-defeating political overreach and domination of progressivism as such. This fundamental defect of our revolutionary legacy should be a critical, transformational concern to Ethiopian democrats and patriots today.
2. Old school “radical” progressive entities in Ethiopia, including the TPLF, the OLF, the EPRP (which has today sadly reduced itself to political irrelevance), and other groups have not really attempted to learn from social strata and distinct communities they wanted to lead in revolutionary struggle and “liberate.” Instead, they developed their political agenda and programs through polemicizing and fighting against one another. While the victors, like the TPLF and its ethnic and political cousin, the EPLF, gained dictatorial state power over the “nations, nationalities, and peoples” they supposedly liberated, the vanquished, like the EPRP and the OLF, were reduced to the political margins, ending up with the dubious status of the permanent opposition.
The Orwellian reversal of values that has come to characterize the existing paradigm of progressivism in Ethiopia (where professed democracy is actually dictatorship and “national liberation” really means partisan domination) should not be understood as a “betrayal” or an unexpected outcome of the Revolution. From the outset, Ethiopian revolutionaries have been ideologically conditioned and organizationally trained to suppress free civic and political activity in the country and to substitute their own imperious, partisan activism for the autonomous agency of citizens and communities.
Against this tradition of “radical” closure of social and political space, the new progressive project in Ethiopia would allow various self-organized civil society groups, parties and movements to provide bases for national consensus and solidarity within a more open and democratic political framework. In so far as the national environment is relatively open, which is not to say fragmented or politically unregulated, it will invite and facilitate the autonomous democratic participation of various groups and parties opposed to Woyane tribal tyranny. The more transparent and differentiated the environment, the greater participants’ experience of agency within it; and the greater and freer participants’ experience of agency, the stronger, more democratic and sustainable the Ethiopian national consensus and solidarity they are likely to affirm and establish.
3. The projected Ethiopian progressive consensus can be expected to generate active, mutually supportive relationship between political forces, on the one hand, and social constituencies and the nation as a whole, on the other, in a way and to an extent not possible in the old structural model of revolutionary politics. The existing structure has taken shape exclusively from within its own ideology and partisan agenda. In contrast, the new progressive politics would assume a more dynamic form which would allow it greater openness to the Ethiopian social and national landscape, to align itself with varying socio-economic and cultural contexts in the country and with the nation’s vital interests. The nation as a whole and distinct communities and social strata within it will no longer be passive objects of authoritarian “revolutionary” domination and manipulation. Instead, they would become active participants in the conception and enactment of progressive thought.
4. Relative openness or transparency as a principle for organizing a new progressive political order and public sphere in Ethiopia is neither a mechanism for dictatorial rule as usual nor a license for one kind of tribal hegemony or another. It is a way of accommodating pluralism and difference within an integral national whole. The shift from partisan-authoritarian closure of the social and political space to a more open and democratic order does not dispense with national cohesion and leadership. In the absence of overall direction, coordination and regulation, the principles of openness and democracy are as impracticable as they are inconsequential.
So the issue is not whether the new Ethiopian progressive consensus needs leadership or direction, but what kind of direction. In as much as its leadership gains acceptance and support from diverse social, political, and regional bases while maintaining its cohesion, it also gains more democratic validity and legitimacy than the Woyane regime or its predecessor ever did.
5. Political coalitions and alliances that paper over significant differences among opposition groups, say, between factions or elements that prioritize identity politics over common Ethiopian nationality, and those who would reverse this order of priority, may have some political value. For they may lessen disagreements and conflicts by strengthening cooperation on the basis of shared immediate interests and by achieving limited objectives in the short- or medium-term.
But such alliances are ineffective, or may even be counter-productive, in reckoning with fundamental issues and principles about which the groups may quietly differ and in resolving underlying differences for the long-term. Limited political successes gained from the alliances can be easily undone if they are attained through merely tactical calculations and measures that do not relate to or address broader relevant issues and problems of progressive change in Ethiopia. More generally, there is a need to clarify the relationship that should obtain between what any coalition or alliance by itself can achieve and what outcome or impact its actions can have as part of larger movements of Ethiopian social-historical and political forces.
Ideas
6. Old fashioned Ethiopian revolutionaries, including Woyane ethnonationalists, who cut their progressive teeth on the Student Movement and on Marxist-Leninist ideology, have generally seen themselves engaged in serious, high-minded political work driven by critical reason. They apparently believed their activism and struggle were guided by high concept. But behind this self-image lies a paradoxical orientation toward ideas. On the one hand, invoking revolutionary ideas and goals had so much force and influence that theory assumed a dominant, commanding position over everything else, even as it abstractly expressed egalitarian values and ideals. Fiercely held ideological dogma and agenda were privileged over vital Ethiopian national interests and affairs.
On the other hand, old school progressivism in Ethiopia was impatient with any attempt at a serious discussion and development of political ideas in the Ethiopian context. Its priority has been quickly and tightly controlling the articulation of political concepts, including those of democracy and nationality, within narrow, exclusively partisan confines. Preoccupation with tactical activism which predisposes traditional radicals to immediately instrumentalize ideas for contestation, polemic, agitation, and propaganda has obstructed any openness that may sustain broadly enlightening, reflective, and politically productive thought.
Post-revolutionary Ethiopia has thus for decades endured two extremes at once – too much “theory,” yet too little thought; a whole lot of conceptualizing and idealizing going hand in hand with an abundance of brutal tyranny; high-minded dogma of national liberation wedded to crass tribalism.
Ethiopia: Severe problems with free speech
In Africa, Traditional Media Maintain Lead over New Media
WASHINGTON, June 28, 2013 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ –IREX’s latest Africa Media Sustainability Index (MSI) found that traditional media remain the preferred source of news. Many benefits presented by online media have yet to reach most citizens in the 42 sub-Saharan African countries analyzed. Nonetheless, transition to online and mobile format media appears inevitable. See www.irex.org/msi for the full report.Malian journalists characterize online media as in its infancy. In Botswana a participant stressed that his colleagues do not adequately use online resources to gather and distribute news. Online advertising flourishes in Malawi but participants questioned profitability. Namibia’s lack of local language content online is a barrier to many; in Burundi, and many countries, steep cost prevents access. In Ethiopia, critical bloggers find their content blocked periodically and report cases of threats.
Positive findings do indicate a brighter future. Kenyan participants cheered improved affordability and availability of Internet, and noted social media is taught in some journalism schools. Internet-broadcast radio shows potential sustainability in Liberia. In Angola, online media provide an outlet for critical analysis of the government.
The MSI’s unique methodology measures journalism quality, media management, news plurality, press freedom, and institutions supporting media. African journalists, media advocates, academics, and related professionals evaluate their own media sector. Results are compiled by IREX, a leading organization working to develop independent media globally.
The MSI has recorded progress and setbacks since 2007. Gains have been made in press freedoms, as journalists face fewer overt challenges to free speech. Countries adopting the Declaration of Table Mountain, which decriminalizes libel, have further improved. However, business management practices have suffered as revenues dropped during the global economic slowdown. Fears of losing advertising revenues are pervasive, such that editorial and advertising interests often intersect in newsrooms.
South Africa remains the region’s best performer, despite backsliding in recent years, followed by Namibia and Ghana. Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan were considered unsustainable, demonstrating severe problems with free speech, the quality of journalism, and absence or weakness of institutions supportive of a free media environment.
The U.S. Agency for International Development funds the Africa MSI. Other editions cover 40 countries across Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The MSI is a trusted evaluation of global media health, providing donors, media advocates, local professionals, and scholars a decade of rich data.
SOURCE: IREX
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