by Messay Kebede
Since the death of Prime Minister Meles, the political situation of Ethiopia
has entered a phase of uncertainty with no clear momentum toward stabilization.
Despite predictions of the imminent collapse of the EPRDF, either under the
pressure of a popular uprising or splits within its ranks, the political
situation shows no sign of heightened challenge to the regime. In fact, it
remains a mystery that no political upheavals of any importance occurred
following the death of Meles, who was after all the center and the driving force
of the whole system. On the other hand, however, notwithstanding an orderly
succession, the uncertainty has not been removed and symptoms of unresolved
internal conflicts transpire occasionally. Above all, the extent to which the
new prime minister is really in charge being anything but assured, the
vacillation of the system lingers, given that the entire government was designed
to function under the leadership of a strong and unchallenged prime
minister.
One thing is sure: the uncertainty cannot go on indefinitely and nothing can
be done to improve the political climate and the economic conditions of the
country without some reforms. This is to say that change is inevitable and that
it will come sooner or later. The question is: which direction is the change
likely to take? For my part, I have no desire to play the game of predictions.
Instead, I want to present some possible scenarios and invite political leaders
and activists who care about Ethiopia to reflect on them so as to be ready for
various eventualities instead of being fixated on the outcome that they long
for.
Given the amplifying state of frustration of the county, the only way of
avoiding ominous developments is not only that the prime minister really
exercises power, but that he uses this power to correct some of the glaring
derailments of Meles, especially by easing the repressive policy adopted by him.
Meles effected the reversal of democratization because he could count on the
complete obedience of the repressive machine of the state. Haile Mariam does not
have the same control and cannot have it without further empowering the very men
who command the repressive apparatuses. In other words, failure to promote
reform is for Haile Mariam to give more power to the TPLF instead of reducing
it. By contrast, the political choice of easing repression, better still, of
initiating reforms reduces the importance of the repressive forces and creates
momentum toward the gathering of the popular support and legitimacy that Haile
Mariam needs to prevail over Meles’s old clique.
The dilemma of the prime minister is thus clear enough: in order to assert
himself, he has to correct Meles’s policy, but in so doing he runs the risk of
antagonizing the TPLF and hence of losing his position altogether. Conversely,
if he upholds the policy of his predecessor, he simply feeds on the image of a
puppet of the TPLF, which image underlines his irrelevance, thereby instigating
his removal. Surely, since the longer the policy of Meles continues, the more
repressive the state must become, the TPLF will be better off to do the job on
its own than to use the cumbersome mediation of a puppet. The dilemma shows that
Haile Mariam’s best bet is to go in the direction of easing repression, which at
least promises the prospect of him becoming his own man.
The huge unknown is whether Haile Mariam has the right political ambition to
want to stand by himself and the political skill to outmaneuver the TPLF and
other challengers. I must admit that I have no a ready answer for this question.
I also confess my pessimism, even though I recognize that more time is needed
before one makes a final judgment. True, I am encouraged by his open
condemnation of the displacement of the Amhara settlers, but remain skeptical
because of the lack of any practical follow-up to correct the injustice.
Moreover, the appalling dismissal of the appeals of Eskinder Nega, Andualem
Arage, and other political prisoners by the higher court did nothing to reduce
my skepticism. To sum up my position, in light of the time needed for
consolidation, I say that Haile Mariam still deserves the benefit of the doubt
even if the performances of his government are not, so far, promising.
In case Haile Mariam remains submerged by the TPLF, the scenario of an
increasingly repressive government that could only further aggrieve the
Ethiopian masses presents itself. My contention is that unless the TPLF takes
the rightful place of being a party among others within the coalition of the
EPRDF, it cannot maintain the hegemonic role it has played so far without
pushing repression to a point far exceeding that of Meles. By force of habit
and because of his political shrewdness, Meles was able to rise as the
unquestioned leader of the EPRDF. After successive purges of all those who could
threaten him, none among the remaining leaders of the TPLF has the stature or
even the capacity to command the same authority. Various competitors both within
the TPLF and the EPRDF
