Thursday, January 29, 2015

The Invention of Ethnic Politics By Messay Kebede (PhD.)

Take a random group of Ethiopians as you find them in any public place. You will never hear them defining themselves by a single characteristic. If you ask one of them how a person is defined, he/she will say that a person is defined by age, gender, class, social role, religion, culture, ethnic background, etc. This same person is also Ethiopian, African, and human. This means that, outside a political realm, individuals see their personality as a heterogeneous unity, as the interactions, interpenetrations of multiple identities yielding a unified person, like different notes compose a musical piece. This heterogeneous self is the reality of all individuals, how they grasp their essence and existence. Be it noted that nothing is distinct or dominant in the claimed unity; rather, all the factors interpenetrate and constitute a changing and complex sense of oneself.
Let us follow these individuals in their place of work, worship, or hangouts. A slight change occurs: though they remain the same individuals, they alternatively assume distinct, dominant features. In their work place, they are teachers, soldiers, security officers, judges, etc.; in their worship place, they are Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Protestants, etc.; in their hangouts, they are friends or mates. And when they return home, they are fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, etc. In all these different places, one feature temporarily dominates all the rest.
Now let us go to a political meeting. Here profession and home personality subside into the background. Individuals are essentially labelled by their class, ethnic group, religion or gender, depending on the ideology of the group organizing the meeting. However, one difference springs up in the case of a meeting supporting an extremist agenda: not only are the leaders of the political meeting asking participants to subordinate all their person to one determination by which they demarcate themselves, but they also urge them to use the demarcation to oppose and exclude all those who do not belong to the same ethnic group, religion, or class. The intention is to obtain a high-powered mobilization by overvaluing one determination to the point of stirring up deep emotional forces, such as fear, resentment, and hatred, or superiority and domination.
The result of this one-sided conditioning is that individuals completely identify themselves with the overemphasized feature. Politicians promote this exclusory determination for two essential reasons. 1. It gives them complete control over the person: once they have induced a sectarian identity, they are in possession of a tool able to trigger at will all sorts of emotional responses from their followers. Evidently, the political elite cannot have absolute control over individuals if they retain many allegiances that involve them in different social milieus and entail different modes of association and behavior. 2. The overemphasized identity posits the exclusion of all who are not of the same religion, ethnic group, or class. This ordering crowns the excluders as the only legitimate representatives of the groups shaped by the segregating identities and, most importantly, repudiates all competing elites on the ground that they do not partake of the same identities.
A characteristic example of exclusion is the overdetermination of class in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, which Ethiopian educated elites adopted in the 60s and 70s. As many of you remember, everything was then subordinated to class belonging and everything was analyzed from the perspective of class interests. The outcome was a politics of hatred against feudal and bourgeois classes and against all those who refused Marxism for one reason or another. It enabled the mobilization of peasants, workers and self-righteous students and intellectuals, the very ones who claimed to have committed class-suicide. Most of all, it promoted power-hungry elites to the rank of political and ideological leadership on the strength of their lofty commitment to justice and freedom for the masses. However, disgruntled and ambitious members of the Ethiopian armed forces came out with a similar commitment, the outcome of which was the formation of the Derg. We know the rest, especially how the Derg turned the ideology of exclusion of students and intellectuals against themselves and assumed the sole leadership of the revolution.
Weakened by the lack of internal support, the Derg was defeated by another politics of exclusion, this time based on ethnicity. Ethnic politics has its roots in the Marxist-Leninist ideology: like the latter, it is a politics of polarization (otherwise known as dialectics) aiming at destroying those perceived as opponents. This common inspiration facilitated the rise of ethnic ideology because the priority given to class by Marxism-Leninism had undermined national cohesion by presenting the imperial regime and the Derg as the dominance of the Amhara ethnic elite. Very early, those who created the TPLF understood that class exclusion, as advocated by the Marxist ideology, was a deadlock for them in that they would never achieve prominence on the national scene so long as the Amhara supremacy was still in place. To undermine that dominance, they needed a sectarian ideolgy not only for themselves but also for all non-Amhara Ethiopians: only in a country fragmented along ethnic politics could an elite claiming to represent a minority group hope to conquer national prominence.
With the help of the Stalinist version of Marxism, the founders of the TPLF reworked their socialist commitment in such a way that polarization moved from class to ethnicity. As a result, ethnic groups were baptized dominated nations, with the consequence that they gained the right to secede from Ethiopia if they so wish. With ethnicity, the leaders of the TPLF had thus created an exclusive entitlement to represent the Tigrean people, since unlike class or religion, the ethnic criterion excludes non-Tigrean from power competition. In addition, the fragmentation of Ethiopia gave them a hegemonic position as the only group commanding a viable armed force following the dissolution of the national army. To crown it all, the portrayal of the Amhara as the sole culprit for Tigrean marginalization and the so-called “ferocious colonial” conquest and mistreat of the Oromo and Southern peoples became the dominant discourse of ethnic federalism. The purpose of this exaggerated and one-sided portrayal is to harness powerful sentiments of resentment and hatred to the politics of exclusion whose sole goal is the empowerment of a Tigrean elite.
Now contrast identity politics with the democratic ideal. Obviously, of all the forms of mobilization, the one that brings into play what individuals have in common rather than what separates them is none other than the democratic principle. It is inspired by the politics of human rights and expressly states that all individuals, regardless of age, gender, class, ethnicity, religion, etc., have equal rights. This form of mobilization comes close to the reality of the human person as a unity of heterogeneous commitments and is eminently refractory to the politics of exclusion. Its essence is to allow individuals to form free associations in accordance with their heterogeneous and varying interests and preoccupations.
To highlight the difference, take an Oromo for instance: besides being Oromo, he/she belongs to a class to which Amara and Tigreans belong as well; he/she is Christian or Muslim like Amhara and Gurage are Christian or Muslim; he/she is Ethiopian, then African, just like any other ethnic groups in Ethiopia. For an approach promoting human rights, the various identities of a person, far from being mutually exclusive, become complementary, thereby actualizing the reality of the human person as a unity of diversity.
Not so for ethnic politics: it reduces the human to one dimensionality and so is repressive, being but the manner people are shaped to empower a sectarian elite. It results in a closed society whose irony is that it must revive the diversity that it refuses in the name of ethnic purity in order to evolve into a democratic society. Indeed, in closing on itself, the ethnic community cannot but take note of its own internal divisions promoted by different class interests, diverse religious commitments, unequal regional and local statuses, etc. The way this diversity is recognized, better still allowed freedom of expression and organization decides its democratic future.
If diversity is a requirement of democratic organization, why then reject it in the greater union only to reestablish it in a smaller unit? Why not struggle here and now to organize the already given diversity into a democratic society? All the more reason for opting for the great union is that the postponement of democracy in the name of ethnicity could have the adverse effect of consecrating the model of a uniform society, which constitutes the stuff of all one-party systems, presidents for life, fundamentalist states, in short of dictatorial regimes. What political systems pursuing the socialist ideology, identifying state and religion, or enforcing ethnic hegemony or purity, have in common is the practice of exclusion and the attendant totalitarian rule. To say so is to understand that polarizing politics, whatever its claim, is never about democracy. It is about empowering elites whose exclusiveness requires nothing short of totalitarian rule.
The belief that identity politics is the path to democracy ignores at its own perils the lessons of its application in Ethiopia. Not only are other ethnic groups suffering under the yoke of the hegemony of one sectarian elite claiming to represent the interests of an ethnic group, but also those who are supposed to be represented are made powerless against their own representatives. Indeed, to politically challenge the Tigrean ruling elite, Tigreans need to associate with other ethnic groups and they cannot do so without going against identity politics and establishing associations with other people based on class, professional, religious, etc., interests. But in so doing, they are certain to provoke the repressive power of the elite representing them, which power is no longer dependent on Tigray because it controls the national state of Ethiopia. In sum, all those who expect democracy through the ethnic path should pause for one moment and ponder over the saying: “የቆጡን አወርድ ብላ የብብቷን ጣለች.”
Messay Kebede is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dayton in Ohio. He taught philosophy at Addis Ababa University from 1976 to 1993. He also served as chair of the department of philosophy from 1980 to 1991.

Ethiopia: The great media crackdown

Why this affects all Africans?

Johannesburg (South Africa) – Ahead of elections this year, the Ethiopian government is cracking down hard on any kind of free press – shutting down publications, jailing journalists and harassing their families. This is not just Ethiopia’s problem, however. As the home of the African Union, and as an oft-punted role model for African development, Ethiopia’s censorship problem is Africa’s too.Ethiopia media crackdown
It’s not easy being a journalist in Ethiopia. In fact, it is nearly impossible, according to a new Human Rights Watch report that documents the scale of the state’s censorship apparatus. As journalists ourselves, it makes for highly disturbing reading (and once again highlights why the South African media fraternity’s fight against the proposed secrecy bill is so important – the distance between that and the Ethiopian situation is not so far as one might think).
“Ethiopia’s government has systematically assaulted the country’s independent voices, treating the media as a threat rather than a valued source of information and analysis,” said Leslie Lefkow, deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “Ethiopia’s media should be playing a crucial role in the May elections, but instead many journalists fear that their next article could get them thrown in jail.”
The authors of the report spoke to 70 Ethiopian journalists, many in exile, who painted a dismal picture of the state of Ethiopian media. The government exerts control in many different ways – some subtle, some quite the opposite.
According to the report, “Most print publications in Ethiopia are closely affiliated with the government and rarely stray from government perspectives on critical issues. Private print publications face numerous regulatory challenges and regular harassment from security personnel. Publications critical of government are regularly shut down, and printers and distributors of critical publications are closed. Journalists critical of government policies and their families live in constant fear of harassment, arrest, and losing their livelihoods. The state controls most of the media, and the few surviving private media self-censor their coverage of politically sensitive issues for fear of being shut down.”
This is bad news for Ethiopia, of course. It is rarely a good sign when a government attacks the press – as South Africans in particular we can appreciate the dangers of a single, state-sponsored narrative.
But it is also bad news for the continent as a whole.
The Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa is home to the African Union, the continental body tasked with driving African development and righting the continent’s many wrongs. This makes it the de facto African capital, a hub of diplomatic intrigue; a place where important people meet to exchange secrets and conclude deals; and the centre around which so much of Africa’s politics revolves.
If we want to know what’s happening in Africa, we need to know what’s happening in Addis Ababa. Without a free press, we can’t. How else are we going to figure out what exactly our leaders are up to? They are certainly not going to tell us themselves.
It’s not just media, either. Ethiopia keeps a close eye on NGOs and think tanks working in the country too, even those with continental mandates, and has the power to grant or deny access to the African Union by manipulating visas – if you don’t get a visa for Ethiopia, you don’t get to visit the AU. This makes researchers and advocacy organisations very wary of being too critical of the current Ethiopian administration, even when they shout loudly about the failings of other African governments.
This means, ultimately, that we are getting a distorted picture of the Ethiopian story – and the Ethiopian story is a vital one in the context of African development. Ethiopia, along with Rwanda, is advocating a very specific developmental model, one that prioritises economic growth and socio-economic rights ahead of liberal luxuries such as democracy, participation and human rights. The theory is that it’s ok to silence opposition and crack down on media as long as the government is improving employment, education, health, etc.
The figures suggest that this model might just be working. Ethiopia’s GDP is growing at about 10.4% while over the past decade, the country has registered statistically significant growth in the welfare, education and health categories of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance. But can we trust these figures?
A recent example from Rwanda, where free press is also non-existent, is instructive. On 15 January, David Himbara, a former economic adviser to President Paul Kagame, explained in an op-ed on Quartz why he quit his job. “I resigned not only because he was tyrannizing the nation, but also because he asked me to tamper with the truth about the economy,” he said.
Himbara argues that the apparent successes of Rwanda’s model for economic growth are illusory, and based on poor or deliberately misleading data. But in the absence of a free press, or a free civil society, this data goes unchallenged, and the Rwandan model is hailed as a success and eyed by other African leaders (especially those with an authoritarian streak) as a role model for their own countries.
So too with Ethiopia: without anyone to tell us otherwise, Ethiopia’s development approach looks like it is working, even if it’s not (this is not to judge this approach one way or the other, just to observe that in the absence of any kind of independent information we cannot gauge its effectiveness).
So that’s why the absence of independent media in Ethiopia affects us all. Without the beady eye of a free press observing the diplomatic shenanigans in Addis Ababa, we really have no idea what deals our leaders are making at the AU or why they are making them; and we run the real risk that the Ethiopian story will become the African story, without any real idea if that story is fact or fiction.
Source: Daily Maverick (South Africa)