Sunday, June 30, 2013

Possibilities of a new Ethiopian consensus

By Tesfaye Demmellash (Ph.D.)     

The founding principles and aims of progressive politics in Ethiopia may not be entirely in doubt today, but its operative ideas and practices have long been open to question and critique. This is true, though Ethiopian literati have generally not shown interest in subjecting our vexing legacy of progressivism to retrospective scrutiny and in assessing its current status and function.
No longer persuasive intellectually, morally, and politically, particularly to Ethiopia’s younger generation, the staying power of the old progressivism within the Woyane regime and in some oppositions circles lies in the inertia of established, residual conventions and habits of Marxist-Leninist thought. Its “radical” attitudes, ideology, and practice have consistently produced tyrannical leaders and repressive regimes (those of the Derg, the TPLF and, in Eritrea, the EPLF). It has everywhere turned the promise of national revolution into an exclusive partisan performance and the democratic aspirations of the people into the dictatorial agenda of narrow, insular elites.
So we know that, far from offering simple and ready solutions to our national problems, the existing tradition of forward-looking politics is deeply problematic.  In fact, it constitutes a major source of Ethiopia’s present national crisis. If it is to help bring about the nation’s democratic renewal, our troubled progressive inheritance has to undergo major conceptual and practical renovation itself. It has to be thought anew – from the ground up.
This is a necessary first step toward a new progressive national agreement in Ethiopia. Patterns of dogmatic thought, forms and mechanisms of partisan dictatorship and styles of anti-Ethiopian rhetoric and polemic associated with the old tradition of “radical” politics are today integral parts of oppositional as well as ruling ethnonationalist orthodoxy.  How could contemporary Ethiopian patriots strike a grand progressive bargain with champions of this orthodoxy whose resentment of Ethiopia borders on a reverse chauvinism that devalues and negates our common national culture?
So opening up the old tradition of progressivism in Ethiopia – in all its partisan and tribal forms – to critical, forward-looking reconstruction is essential to the building of a new, more democratic general agreement among the nation’s diverse political, ethnic, and cultural communities. The dismantling of the present, moribund system should create intellectual and political space for thinking up alternative ideas of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, federalism, and local self-government in Ethiopia. It should allow new ideas to be more freely articulated, debated, discussed, and agreed upon by the widest possible Ethiopian public. In short, the dismantling of the old paradigm of revolutionary thought and action can be expected to facilitate the elimination, finally, of dictatorially imposed rule in Ethiopia and allow for a lasting consensually achieved democratic national and political order in the country.
Though possible and desirable, the building of a new Ethiopian progressive consensus today is, however, a great challenge. The collective effort has to resolve not only the differences and antagonisms of particular parties, groups, coalitions, and movements, but also the conflicts of distinct modes of national concern: ethnic nationalism, modern Ethiopian national consciousness that transcends ethnicity, and traditional patriotism that stresses Ethiopian historical roots and identity. In some of their extreme variants, these forms of national concern may be repellent to one another, but they are not entirely self-contained and mutually exclusive. Still, they remain recognizable species of nationalism to be reckoned with by consensus builders. Separately, none of them adequately represents the breadth and depth of Ethiopianness today. Indeed, both governing and oppositional forms of ethnonationalism militate against the Ethiopian experience, a matter of great concern and urgency for patriotic forces.
Traditional patriots who accentuate Ethiopian historical sources and identity are not necessarily averse to modern ideas, like democracy and federalism, but such ideas may not be the major driving force of their national concern. Sensing, correctly, the existential threat Ethiopia faces under the divisive tyranny of the Woyanes and the wholesale tribalization of her national interests and affairs, some may be in no mood currently to quibble about ideas. Perhaps disenchanted with the global values of progressivism some Ethiopian patriots may be turning inward in resistance, pushed by prevailing conditions in the country to a protective affirmation of tradition and identity.
Reclaiming and defending the national base is essential, but we can’t go back to our roots simply and straightaway, in abstraction from present progressive concerns. There is a danger here of patriotic groups inflicting political marginalization on themselves in their disinclination to address major issues confronting the country today. The biggest challenge we face is reconciling the claims of national tradition and integrity with those of contemporary pluralism and diversity through a new Ethiopian national-democratic consensus and solidarity.
The initial task of developing a general forward-looking agreement among various groups and forces in the resistance against TPLF dictatorship, with a keen eye toward post-Woyane Ethiopian political order, is one of establishing a broadly inclusive yet definite framework of ideas, principles, and practices. We need a widely shared set of terms, concepts, and perspectives through which Ethiopian national and political issues may be commonly as well as distinctively defined, grasped, and approached. The framework of thought and discourse should be capable of integrally handling pluralism, difference, and dissent in our common national life.
Departing from this basic understanding, I offer the following theses on progressive change in Ethiopia. The theses are summary notes intended for discussion and further analysis among concerned Ethiopian intellectuals, activists, journalists, opposition entities, civil society groups, and other stake-holders. They are organized around three major overlapping spheres which I consider to be crucial battlegrounds where Ethiopian progressive consensus has to be fought for and won, where we leave the old progressivism behind and embrace the new. These battlegrounds are politics, ideas, and identity.
Theses on Progressive Change in Ethiopia
Politics
1. The underlying defect of the old and still operative paradigm of progressivism in Ethiopia (and Eritrea) is its aggressive, expansionist take-over and domination of the relatively autonomous spheres of ideas, culture, religion, nationality, economy, polity and civil society, more or less incorporating all these domains in calculations and strategies of imperious partisan power. Operating solely or primarily on the basis of priorities and agenda set unilaterally by a narrow political elite with unlimited appetite for power, the paradigm reduces all of these spheres of social and national life to objects and extensions of dictatorial rule.
This is a systemic flaw characteristic of an entire tradition of revolutionary thought and practice, not merely that of particular parties and fronts. The claim here is that the paradigm itself – rather than its “failure” or distortion – led not only to the tyrannical regimes of the Derg and the TPLF but, more broadly, to the self-defeating political overreach and domination of progressivism as such. This fundamental defect of our revolutionary legacy should be a critical, transformational concern to Ethiopian democrats and patriots today.
2. Old school “radical” progressive entities in Ethiopia, including the TPLF, the OLF, the EPRP (which has today sadly reduced itself to political irrelevance), and other groups have not really attempted to learn from social strata and distinct communities they wanted to lead in revolutionary struggle and “liberate.” Instead, they developed their political agenda and programs through polemicizing and fighting against one another. While the victors, like the TPLF and its ethnic and political cousin, the EPLF, gained dictatorial state power over the “nations, nationalities, and peoples” they supposedly liberated, the vanquished, like the EPRP and the OLF, were reduced to the political margins, ending up with the dubious status of the permanent opposition.
The Orwellian reversal of values that has come to characterize the existing paradigm of progressivism in Ethiopia (where professed democracy is actually dictatorship and “national liberation” really means partisan domination) should not be understood as a “betrayal” or an unexpected outcome of the Revolution. From the outset, Ethiopian revolutionaries have been ideologically conditioned and organizationally trained to suppress free civic and political activity in the country and to substitute their own imperious, partisan activism for the autonomous agency of citizens and communities.
Against this tradition of “radical” closure of social and political space, the new progressive project in Ethiopia would allow various self-organized civil society groups, parties and movements to provide bases for national consensus and solidarity within a more open and democratic political framework. In so far as the national environment is relatively open, which is not to say fragmented or politically unregulated, it will invite and facilitate the autonomous democratic participation of various groups and parties opposed to Woyane tribal tyranny. The more transparent and differentiated the environment, the greater participants’ experience of agency within it; and the greater and freer participants’ experience of agency, the stronger, more democratic and sustainable the Ethiopian national consensus and solidarity they are likely to affirm and establish.
3. The projected Ethiopian progressive consensus can be expected to generate active, mutually supportive relationship between political forces, on the one hand, and social constituencies and the nation as a whole, on the other, in a way and to an extent not possible in the old structural model of revolutionary politics. The existing structure has taken shape exclusively from within its own ideology and partisan agenda. In contrast, the new progressive politics would assume a more dynamic form which would allow it greater openness to the Ethiopian social and national landscape, to align itself with varying socio-economic and cultural contexts in the country and with the nation’s vital interests. The nation as a whole and distinct communities and social strata within it will no longer be passive objects of authoritarian “revolutionary” domination and manipulation. Instead, they would become active participants in the conception and enactment of progressive thought. 
4. Relative openness or transparency as a principle for organizing a new progressive political order and public sphere in Ethiopia is neither a mechanism for dictatorial rule as usual nor a license for one kind of tribal hegemony or another. It is a way of accommodating pluralism and difference within an integral national whole. The shift from partisan-authoritarian closure of the social and political space to a more open and democratic order does not dispense with national cohesion and leadership. In the absence of overall direction, coordination and regulation, the principles of openness and democracy are as impracticable as they are inconsequential.
So the issue is not whether the new Ethiopian progressive consensus needs leadership or direction, but what kind of direction. In as much as its leadership gains acceptance and support from diverse social, political, and regional bases while maintaining its cohesion, it also gains more democratic validity and legitimacy than the Woyane regime or its predecessor ever did.
5. Political coalitions and alliances that paper over significant differences among opposition groups, say, between factions or elements that prioritize identity politics over common Ethiopian nationality, and those who would reverse this order of priority, may have some political value. For they may lessen disagreements and conflicts by strengthening cooperation on the basis of shared immediate interests and by achieving limited objectives in the short- or medium-term.
But such alliances are ineffective, or may even be counter-productive, in reckoning with fundamental issues and principles about which the groups may quietly differ and in resolving underlying differences for the long-term. Limited political successes gained from the alliances can be easily undone if they are attained through merely tactical calculations and measures that do not relate to or address broader relevant issues and problems of progressive change in Ethiopia. More generally, there is a need to clarify the relationship that should obtain between what any coalition or alliance by itself can achieve and what outcome or impact its actions can have as part of larger movements of Ethiopian social-historical and political forces.
Ideas
6. Old fashioned Ethiopian revolutionaries, including Woyane ethnonationalists, who cut their progressive teeth on the Student Movement and on Marxist-Leninist ideology, have generally seen themselves engaged in serious, high-minded political work driven by critical reason. They apparently believed their activism and struggle were guided by high concept. But behind this self-image lies a paradoxical orientation toward ideas. On the one hand, invoking revolutionary ideas and goals had so much force and influence that theory assumed a dominant, commanding position over everything else, even as it abstractly expressed egalitarian values and ideals. Fiercely held ideological dogma and agenda were privileged over vital Ethiopian national interests and affairs.
On the other hand, old school progressivism in Ethiopia was impatient with any attempt at a serious discussion and development of political ideas in the Ethiopian context. Its priority has been quickly and tightly controlling the articulation of political concepts, including those of democracy and nationality, within narrow, exclusively partisan confines. Preoccupation with tactical activism which predisposes traditional radicals to immediately instrumentalize ideas for contestation, polemic, agitation, and propaganda has obstructed any openness that may sustain broadly enlightening, reflective, and politically productive thought.
Post-revolutionary Ethiopia has thus for decades endured two extremes at once – too much “theory,” yet too little thought; a whole lot of conceptualizing and idealizing going hand in hand with an abundance of brutal tyranny; high-minded dogma of national liberation wedded to crass tribalism.

Ethiopia: Severe problems with free speech


In Africa, Traditional Media Maintain Lead over New Media

Internet in Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, EritreaWASHINGTON, June 28, 2013 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ –IREX’s latest Africa Media Sustainability Index (MSI) found that traditional media remain the preferred source of news. Many benefits presented by online media have yet to reach most citizens in the 42 sub-Saharan African countries analyzed. Nonetheless, transition to online and mobile format media appears inevitable. See www.irex.org/msi for the full report.
Malian journalists characterize online media as in its infancy. In Botswana a participant stressed that his colleagues do not adequately use online resources to gather and distribute news. Online advertising flourishes in Malawi but participants questioned profitability. Namibia’s lack of local language content online is a barrier to many; in Burundi, and many countries, steep cost prevents access. In Ethiopia, critical bloggers find their content blocked periodically and report cases of threats.
Positive findings do indicate a brighter future. Kenyan participants cheered improved affordability and availability of Internet, and noted social media is taught in some journalism schools. Internet-broadcast radio shows potential sustainability in Liberia. In Angola, online media provide an outlet for critical analysis of the government.
The MSI’s unique methodology measures journalism quality, media management, news plurality, press freedom, and institutions supporting media. African journalists, media advocates, academics, and related professionals evaluate their own media sector. Results are compiled by IREX, a leading organization working to develop independent media globally.
The MSI has recorded progress and setbacks since 2007. Gains have been made in press freedoms, as journalists face fewer overt challenges to free speech. Countries adopting the Declaration of Table Mountain, which decriminalizes libel, have further improved. However, business management practices have suffered as revenues dropped during the global economic slowdown. Fears of losing advertising revenues are pervasive, such that editorial and advertising interests often intersect in newsrooms.
South Africa remains the region’s best performer, despite backsliding in recent years, followed by Namibia and Ghana. Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan were considered unsustainable, demonstrating severe problems with free speech, the quality of journalism, and absence or weakness of institutions supportive of a free media environment.
The U.S. Agency for International Development funds the Africa MSI. Other editions cover 40 countries across Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The MSI is a trusted evaluation of global media health, providing donors, media advocates, local professionals, and scholars a decade of rich data.
SOURCE: IREX